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Aid to Families with Unborn Dependent Children: 
May the States Withhold Benefits? 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children1 (AFDC) is one of the 
categorical public assistance programs established by the Social Se-
curity Act of 1935.2 The program has been characterized as a scheme 
of "cooperative federalism"8-a state need not participate in it,4 but 
if it does participate, the federal government provides funds pursuant 
to a formula delineated in the Social Security Act.5 Under this for-
mula the state must assume a significant portion of the financial 
burden of the AFDC program.6 To be eligible for federal funding, 
a state must submit an AFDC proposal for approval by the Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).7 The state retains 
responsibility for establishing a mechanism to process applications 
and to verify need,8 and each state sets standards of need and the 
level of benefits for classes of eligible recipients.9 Eligibility for 
AFDC entitles the recipient to a monthly cash payment,10 rehabilita-
tive services,11 and medical assistance if the state so provides.12 
I. The statutory provisions governing the AFDC program are codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 601-10 (1970). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970). The other categorical public assistance programs are 
Old Age Assistance, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1970); Aid to the Blind, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1201-06 (1970); and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1351-55 (1970). These three programs have been administered by the federal govern-
ment since January 1, 1974. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. II, 1972); 58 CORNELL L. 
REv. 803, 803-04 (1973). 
3. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 542 (1972): King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 
(1968). 
4. All states do have AFDC programs, however. Bennett, Liberty, Equality and 
Welfare Reform, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 75-76 (1973). In addition, the definition of 
"states," for the purpose of participation in the AFDC program, includes the District 
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 42 U.S.C. § 130l(a)(l) (1970). 
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(l)(A)-(B) (1970). Section 603(a)(l) provides that the federal 
government will reimburse five sixths of the money a state expends, subject to 
limitations on maximum dollar amounts. Also, the federal government assumes 75 
per cent of the administrative costs of the program. 
6. See note 5 supra. 
7, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. II, 1972). Federal 
funds are not made available unless the Secretary approves a state's plan. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 603(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). If there is substantial noncompliance with 
any provision required to be included in a plan, the Secretary may approve payments 
for aspects of the plan not affected by the noncompliance. 42 U.S.C, § 604(a) (1970), 
HEW may promulgate additional requirements for state AFDC programs pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), See 45 C.F.R. §§ 201-80 (1974). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. II, 1972). 
9. King v, Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968). 
10. 42 u.s.c. § 601 (1970). 
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a}(l4)-(15) (1970). The original statute enacted in 1935 did not 
include a provision for rehabilitative and other services. The present provisions were 
added in 1962. See Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. I, pt. A, §§ 104(a)(4), 
(c)(2), 76 Stat. 185. 
12, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(IO) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.IO(a)(l), (b)(l)(i) (1974). The 
562 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 73:561 
The AFDC program has been the focus of substantial contro-
versy. Some critics have characterized it as "inadequate and inequi• 
table."13 It may force spouses to leave home in order to make their 
families eligible for assistance,14 and a family with an unemployed 
wage earner that receives AFDC assistance may be financially better 
off than a family that is ineligible because its head holds a low-paying 
job.15 Moreover, families in which both parents are present are fre-
quently ineligible for AFDC aid, 16 although such families are often 
as needy as eligible families.17 Such cash payments as are made are 
often insufficient to meet the recipient's needs.18 Despite these in-
equities, states have not liberalized eligibility standards, but rather 
have attempted to limit eligibility in order to ease fiscal pressures.10 
One such attempt is reflected in the recent plethora of federal 
cases concerning the question whether an unborn child is eligible 
for assistance under the AFDC program.20 Since AFDC benefits are 
original statute enacted in 1935 did not include a provision for medical assistance. The 
present provisions are the result of the enactment of the Medicaid program in 1965, 
See Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, pt. 2, § 12I(a), 79 Stat. 344. For a 
general discussion of the Medicaid program, see Butler, The Medicaid Program: Cur-
rent Statutory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV, 7 
(May 1974). One who is not eligible for AFDC may still be eligible for aid under state 
programs supplemental to AFDC. These programs, often characterized as "general 
assistance," "general relief," or "home relief," provide minimal benefits as compared to 
AFDC. Because the supplemental programs receive no federal funds, they are not 
subject to federal statutory requirements, and the states have absolute control over the 
distribution of assistance, subject only to constitutional restraints. See A. LAFRANC!l, M. 
SCHROEDER, R. BENNETI &: w. BOYD, I.Aw OF THE POOR 265-66 (1973) [hereinafter LAW 
OF THE POOR); Bennett, supra note 4, at 76. 
13. See Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 19JS, 
59 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 825, 825 (1974). See also H.R. REP, No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, 
96 (1967). . 
14. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 1 (statement of Representative 
Martha Griffiths). See also R. HURLEY, POVERTY AND MENTAL RETARDATION: A CAUSAL 
RELATIONSHIP 165-66 (1969); Bennett, supra note 4, at 77; N.Y. Times, Oct, 27, 1974, § I, 
at 33, col. I (late city ed.). 
15. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at I, col, 6, 
16. The Social Security Act permits states to expand the causes of deprivation of 
parental support or care to include unemployment of the child's father under des• 
ignated conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). In states adopting this option, a family can 
be eligible for AFDC benefits although both mother and father are healthy and living 
together, if the father is unemployed within the meaning of the statute, In about 
half of the states, however, eligibility for AFDC requires the absence of a parent, LAW 
OF THE POOR, supra note 12, at 262·63; Bennett, supra note 4, at 76, 
17. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 1. It has been estimated that 
welfare programs aid only one fourth of those who are poor. R. HURLEY, supra note 
14, at 165-66 (statement of Senator Robert F. Kennedy). 
18. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 3; R. HURLEY, supra note 14, at 
171; Hearings on Nutrition and Human Needs Before the Senate Select Comm, on 
Nutrition and Human Needs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess, 614-15 (1969) [hereinafter Nutrition 
Hearings], 
19. Bennett, supra note 4, at 78. 
20. _Five federal courts of appeals and till'elve district courts have held that the un• 
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available only to families that have a "dependent child," the resolu-
tion of this question hinges upon the interpretation of section 
406(a) of the Social Security Act,21 which defines the term "de-
pendent child." That section does not make explicit reference to the 
eligibility of unborn children under the AFDC program, nor does 
any other section of the Act. A regulation promulgated by the 
Health, Education, and Welfare Department does permit states to 
aid the unborn child and to receive federal funds for so doing, but 
born child is entitled to AFDC benefits: Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), 
a/fg. 363 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 
1974), a/fg. 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.SL.W. 3218 
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 74-242); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), ajfg. 
358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), and Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 
1973); Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), afjg. 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 
1973), reud., 43 U.SL.W. 4374 (U.S. March 18, 1975) [see Postscript-Ed.]; Doe v. Lukhard, 
493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), afjg. 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), petition for cert. 
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. May 24, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. 
Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Jones 
v. Graham, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 18,070 (D. Neb. 1973); 
Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Conn.), reud., 507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Morris v. Houston, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 19,945 (:,'v .D. Mich., Oct. 18, 1974); Welling 
v. Westby, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 19,252 (D.S.D., Jan. 17, 1974). Two district courts 
have granted preliminary injunctions against state denials of AFDC benefits to unborn 
children. Tapia v. Vowell, Civ. No. 73-B-169 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 4, 1973); Tillman v. 
Endsley, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 1117,858 (S.D. Fla. 1973). One 
court of appeals and four federal district courts have held that states are not com-
pelled to give AFDC benefits to unborn children: Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750 
(2d Cir. 1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
880 (1974); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Parks v. Harden, 354 
F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973), reud., 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974); Murrow v. Clifford, 
Civ. No. 114-73 (D.N.J., June 12, 1973), vacated, 502 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974). Two 
state courts have dealt peripherally with the eligibility of the unborn child for AFDC 
benefits. California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian, 11 Cal. 3d 237, 520 P.2d 
970, 113 Cal. Rptr. 154, application for stay denied, 419 U.S. 959 (1974), examined 
whether the unborn child was entitled to be treated as a "person" for the purpose of 
computing the amount of AFDC aid the child would receive pursuant to California 
legislation. Fletcher v. Lavine, 75 Misc. 2d 808, 349 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 
1973), examined whether the local social service department's policy of denying bene-
fits to households of pregnant women who were not recipients of public assistance 
was permissible. Boincs v. Lavine, 71 Misc. 2d 259, 335 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct., Monroe 
Co. 1972), examined the policy of not activating a case when the mother of an unborn 
child is not on AFDC. One state attorney general has issued an opinion denying 
AFDC benefits to unborn children. [1969-1970] S.D. Arrv. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. No. 
69-77, pt. 219 (Aug. 28, 1969). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a} (1970): 
When used in this part-
(a) The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been deprived 
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the 
home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his 
father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, 
stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of 
residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, 
and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one 
and ••• a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly 
attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for 
gainful employment. 
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the agency considers such aid to be at the option of states participat-
ing in the AFDC program.22 
This note will examine whether the duty to provide aid to un-
born children should be imposed on all states participating in the 
AFDC program. It will first consider the argument that denying such 
benefits violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, but the bulk of the note will be devoted to an interpretation 
of the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act. The statutory 
analysis requires several steps. First, it is necessary to examine and 
interpret the cases in which the Supreme Court has analyzed the 
legitimacy of state-imposed eligibility conditions. The focus will then 
shift to the proper reading of the term "dependent children." The 
HEW regulation dealing with aid to the unborn child and the 
stated purposes of the Social Security Act are discussed in this context. 
Pregnant mothers have alleged that the denial of AFDC benefits 
to unborn children contravenes the equal protection clause, resting 
their claim upon the state's failure to grant AFDC aid to them and 
their unborn children while it grants such aid to born children 
and their families. Although the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade28 
raised a major barrier to one aspect of this claim by holding that an 
unborn child is not a "person" for the purpose of asserting rights 
under the equal protection clause, 24 that decision did not foreclose 
the rights of pregnant women. Thus, the court in Carver v. Hooker21l 
allowed pregnant mothers as a class to pursue an equal protection 
claim,26 basing its holding on the perceived harm to the pregnant 
mothers' health if AFDC benefits were denied them.27 In Alcala v. 
Burns,28 the court reached the same result by recognizing that "[t]he 
payments are made to the family and not the unborn child."29 
Having been given the right to assert a claim, the pregnant 
mother must show that the classification granting AFDC aid only 
22. The HEW regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1974), provides that federal 
financial participation is available for "[p]ayments [made] with. respect to an unborn 
child when the fact of pregnancy has been determined by medical diagnosis." As of 
1973, 19 states provided aid to the unborn. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga, 
1973), revd., 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974). 
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
24. 410 U.S. at 156-59. 
25. 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974). 
26. 369 F. Supp. at 210. 
27. The court noted that "[i]f a pregnant woman does not ingest enough protein 
during the gestation period, then the developing fetus will satisfy its needs from the 
permanent protein stores of the mother's body; and this process can result in the 
physical deterioration of her muscles and bodily tissues." 869 F. Supp. at 210. 
28. 862 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afld., 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), revd,; 43 
U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S. March 18, 1975) (See Postscript-Ed.). 
29. 862 F. Supp. at 186. 
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to born, needy children cannot be justified. Several justifications for 
the discrimination have been offered by states.30 
First, it has been asserted that the limitation on aid discourages 
illegitimate births by placing the entire cost of an extramarital 
pregnancy on the unmarried woman.31 This justification, which is 
of course based on a moral judgment, may no longer be viable in 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in King v. Smith.32 The Court 
there emphasized that a state should not attempt to regulate such 
matters as immorality and illegitimacy by placing conditions on 
eligibility for assistance.33 Although King involved an issue of 
statutory construction, rather than a constitutional claim, the un-
acceptability of a rationale of discouraging illegitimacy as support 
for an interpretation of a statute may well be determinative of the 
acceptability of such a justification in a constitutional case as well. 
There is no reason why a state purpose that a court finds invalid and 
therefore unable to support a particular statutory interpretation 
should become valid as a justification for upholding a clearly worded 
statute in an equal protection case. 
30. It is not clear what degree of scrutiny a court must apply to each justification. 
The court has employed tlvo alternative standards in equal protection cases, depend. 
ing on the particular classification being challenged. The court subjects statutes in• 
valving fundamental interests, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), or 
suspect classifications, e.g., Grabam v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), to strict scrutiny, while it accords minimal scrutiny to 
other statutes. E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471 (1970). (The Court in Dandridge rejected the contention that the right 
to sustenance is fundamental. For critical commentary, see Dienes, To Feed the 
Hungry: Judidal Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 555 
(1973).) Under minim.al scrutiny, a court will sustain a classification if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471, 486-87 (1970): "The Equal Protection Clause does not require that a state must 
choose betlveen attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem 
at all • • • • It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from 
invidious discrimination." A court using such a standard might easily conclude that 
AFDC assistance to the needy unborn child is not required by the equal protection 
clause. If strict scrutiny were to be utilized, however, none of the asserted justifica-
tions for denying aid, see text at notes 31-38 infra, could sustain the classification. 
An intermediate standard of review has been used on occasion-its implications for 
aid to the unborn are unclear. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 55, 125,-33 
(1973). See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A. Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1970). For a general discussion of equal protection analysis, see 
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969). 
31. Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D.N.H. 1973), afjd., 501 F.2d 1244 
(1st Cir. 1974). 
32. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
33. 392 U.S. at 321-27. See also 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (Supp. II, 1972); 107 CONG. REc. 
3766 (1961) (statement of Representative Ho!Iman). 
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A second justification, limiting the welfare rolls,34 also appears 
questionable in light of Supreme Court decisions that have con-
sistently held that the goal of lower welfare costs must be achieved 
by means other than limiting the eligibility of individuals for pub-
lic assistance.35 
The third justification given for denying AFDC benefits to preg-
nant women focuses on the usefulness of such a limitation in com-
bating fraud. The fear is that a woman might continue to request 
and receive aid after her pregnancy had been terminated by an abor-
tion.36 Caseworkers, however, should find it easy to investigate al-
leged attempts at fraud-for a start they need only inquire whether 
a pregnant woman who claimed benefits throughout her term in fact 
gave birth, or they could require periodic verification by a physi-
cian. Even if some abuse goes undetected, there is no reason to sus-
pect that the amount of fraud would justify abandoning the program 
or even that it would exceed the level of welfare fraud generally. 
The final claimed justification for denying aid to pregnant 
women rests on the limited objectives of the AFDC program: main-
taining and strengthening the family unit and aiding needy children. 
Until the child is born, it is argued, the concern that a parent be 
in the home to raise the child does not come into play. Aid to unborn 
children thus is not necessary.37 However, there is strong evidence 
that proper prenatal care and nutrition are essential both for the 
child's post-partum development and for the general welfare of the 
family.38 Granting benefits to pregnant women thus would seem to 
further the objectives of the AFDC program. 
In sum, none of the justifications that have been offered for 
denying AFDC benefits to pregnant women are convincing. Whether 
they are so weak as to compel a holding that states must provide such 
benefits, however, is unclear. Much depends on the level of scrutiny 
that should be applied in passing on the question, an issue that ap-
parently has not yet been resolved.89 
34. See Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D, Fla. 1974); Carver v. 
Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir, 1974), 
35. E.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1972): Shapiro v, Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 633 (1968): King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968). The state's interest 
in fiscal management can be achieved by the less onerous means of raising the 
standard of need and lowering the level of benefits. 
36. See Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 804 (D. Mass. 1973). 
37. Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1974). 
38. See notes 129-37 infra and accompanying text. 
39. Even if the equal protection argument does not prevail on its merits, it none-
theless serves as the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal courts over 
suits asserting statutory entitlement to AFDC benefits. Subject-matter jurisdiction in 
such cases is grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), giving a cause of action, inter alia, 
to any person deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law, and 28 U.S.C, 
§ 1343(3) (1970), providing for federal jurisdiction over suits brought "[t]o redress 
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In any case, the equal protection issue need not be decided if 
the Social Security Act itself extends benefits to unborn children, 
and many lower courts have avoided the constitutional question by 
so holding. The decisions are far from unanimous, however. The 
majority of courts have held that inasmuch as the Social Security 
Act does not explicitly exclude unborn children, states participating 
in the program must provide them with AFDC benefits.4° Conversely, 
a minority of courts have reasoned that since the Act does not ex-
plicitly include unborn children, the state need not grant them 
AFDC benefits.41 The split in authority thus centers on the extent 
of a state's discretion to withhold benefits from individuals whose 
eligibility for aid is unclear on the face of the Social Security Act. 
Aspects of this issue have been considered by the Supreme Court 
in King v. Smith,42 Townsend v. Swank,43 Carleson v. Remillard,44 
and New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino.45 
King was the Court's first pronouncement on statutory entitle-
ment to AFDC benefits. Alabama promulgated a "substitute father" 
regulation that denied AFDC benefits to a family whenever the 
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom 
or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the 
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or 
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States • . • ." The equal pro-
tection claim is necessary because the Supreme Court has not yet held that section 
1343(3) can be utilized when a conflict with the Social Security Act is the only asserted 
basis for relief. See, e.g., Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Stogner 
v. Page, I CCH Pov. L. REP. ,i 553.901 (N.D. III. 1970). The assertion of the consti-
tutional claim, whicl1 clearly does come under section 1343(3), allows the federal court 
to adjudicate the statutory claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. See 
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1968). 
Under Hagans, the constitutional claim must be neither "wholly insubstantial" nor 
"obviously frivolous." 415 U.S. at 536-37. The equal protection claim of plaintiff 
mothers in the federal cases concerned with the eligibility of the unborn cllild for 
AFDC benefits clearly would meet this standard. 
Since it is an accepted_ judicial procedure to rule. on a. ~tatutory claim before 
reaclling a constitutional argument, see, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 
(1971); Siler v. Louisville &: Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1908), a single 
federal judge, rather than a three-judge panel convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 
(1970), will first consider the case. Only if the single judge rules against the plaintiffs 
on the statutory issue will a three-judge panel be convened to consider the constitu-
tional claim. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). See, e.g., Murrow v. Clifford, 502 
F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974). 
Jurisdiction over the statutory claim might also be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(1970), provided that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. It could be argued 
that the denial of AFDC benefits to the unborn cllild threatens immediate and per-
sonal damage to life and health that is likely to exceed $10,000. See Marquez v. 
Hardin, 339 F. Supp. 1364, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
40. See cases cited note 20 supra. 
41. See cases cited note 20 supra. 
42. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
43. 404 U.S. 282 (1971). 
44. 406 U.S. 598 (1972). 
45. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
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mother "cohabitated" with any able-bodied male.46 The plaintiff in 
King challenged this regulation as conflicting with the terms of the 
Act;47 Alabama responded that the states have the right to define 
the term "parent" in section 4O6(a) of the Act as including a "sub-
stitute father.''48 
While recognizing that the states have considerable latitude in 
determining the level of benefits they grant to eligible classes,40 the 
Court found that section 4O2(a)(IO) of the Act60 imposed a duty on 
the states to furnish aid to all eligible individuals, and that Alabama 
had breached that duty. 61 Since the legislative history of the Act 
indicated a congressional purpose "to provide programs for the eco-
nomic security and protection of all children ... ,"li2 the Court held 
that the term "parent" in section 4O6(a) included only those persons 
with a legal duty to support a particular child. Because the "sub-
stitute fathers" in the Alabama regulation had no legal duty of 
support, the children involved were "dependent children" within the 
meaning of the Act and had to be provided aid. GB 
The King opinion did not reveal whether the approach the Court 
took there would govern other questions of eligibility under the 
Social Security Act. The Court's subsequent decision in Townsend v. 
Swank,54 however, appeared to indicate that it would. Townsend in-
volved a challenge to Illinois' policy of denying eligibility for AFDC 
to individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one enrolled 
in colleges or universities.55 The broader question was whether states 
could limit the eligibility of an individual who fell within the defini-
tion of "dependent child" in section 4O6(a) of the Act.'i6 Illinois 
argued that its exclusion of college students helped needy children 
to become employable and self-sufficient and ensured the fiscal in-
tegrity of the Illinois welfare program. 57 
The Supreme Court held that, if individuals are eligible under 
46. Alabama used "cohabitation" as a euphemism for "frequent" or "continuing 
sexual relations," and did not require that the substitute father actually reside in the 
home or be the father of the children. 392 U.S. at 314. 
47. 392 U.S. at 329-33. 
48. 392 U.S. at 327. The issue of a child's eligibility turned on the interpretation 
of the term "parent" because section 406(a) in part defines dependent children as 
those "deprived of parental support." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). 
49. 392 U.S. at 318-19. 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(l0) (Supp. II, 1972). 
51. 392 U.S. at 333. 
52. 392 U.S. at 330 (emphasis original). 
53. 392 U.S. at 333, 
54. 404 U.S. 282 (1971). 
55. 404 U.S. at 283-85. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970), 
57. 404 U.S. at 291. 
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federal standards, a state may not exclude them from the AFDC 
program without clear evidence of congressional authorization or 
intent to allow the States to do so.58 Since the Act did not specifically 
exclude individuals aged eighteen to twenty-one and attending col-
lege from eligibility, Illinois' exclusion of that group was invalid 
under the King approach: "King v. Smith establishes that, at least in 
the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly 
evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a 
state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance 
under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and 
is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause."59 Although the 
Court noted that legislative history supported its interpretation that 
children aged eighteen to 1'venty-one and attending college were 
covered by the Act,60 it is not clear whether this finding was essential 
to the Court's holding because it read King to require that states 
grant aid to all individuals apparently eligible on the face of the Act, 
absent explicit congressional authorization of their exclusion. 
This broad interpretation of King was reiterated by the Supreme 
Court in Carleson v. Remillard,61 in which no legislative history 
spoke to the issue of eligibility involved-California's interpretation 
of the term "continued absence" of a parent, one of the criteria for 
eligibility under the Act, as not including absence due to military 
service.62 The Court examined the Social Security Act and its legis-
lative history and found no congressional intent to deny eligibility in 
cases in which a parent is absent on military service.63 The Court 
relied on Townsend and King in holding that eligibility was to be 
measured by the federal standard; that is, individuals not excluded 
by the Act must be given aid unless states are specifically allowed to 
change the requirements for eligibility.64 Since the Court found no 
58. 404 U.S. at 286. 
59. 404 U.S. at 286. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides: 
"This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
60. 404 U.S. at 287-91. 
61. 406 U.S. 598 (1972). 
62. 406 U.S. at 599. 
63. 406 U.S. at 603.04. The Court stated: 
We cannot assume here anymore than we could in King v. Smith, • • • that 
while Congress "intended to provide programs for the economic security and 
protection of all children,'' it also "intended arbitrarily to leave one class of 
destitute children entirely without meaningful protection." •• • • We are espe-
cially confident Congress could not have designed an Act leaving uncared for an 
entire class who became "needy children" because their fathers were in the Armed 
Services defending their country. 
406 U.S. at 604 (emphasis original), quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 330 (1968). 
64. 406 U.S. at 604. 
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evidence indicating a congressional intent to extend eligibility to the 
plaintiffs, Garleson broadened the King and Townsend holdings 
somewhat, in effect creating a presumption of eligibility. So long as 
an individual is arguably covered by the Act, his eligibility should 
be protected from state limitations by the King-Townsend-Carleson 
clear exclusion rule. 
The consistency the Supreme Court showed in King, Townsend, 
and Garleson was apparently ended in New York State Department 
of Social Services v. Dublino,06 which casts some doubt on whether 
the King-Townsend-Carleson approach will be applied to eligibility 
requirements unrelated to need. In Dublino, the Court dealt with 
whether a state permissibly denied public assistance to an eligible 
recipient who refused to participate in a state work program sup• 
plemental to the federal Work Incentive Program (WIN).00 The 
majority opinion focused on whether WIN preempted the supple-
mental state work program, and concluded that it did not.07 The 
Court did not find an express congressional intent to allow states 
to require participation in local work programs, but it inferred such 
an intent from the limited operation of WIN and the omission of 
express preemptive language in the Social Security Act. 08 The Court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether particu-
lar sections of the state supplemental work program at issue con-
flicted with the provisions of WIN.6° Citing King, Townsend, and 
Carleson, the Court noted that if there was a substantial conflict be-
tween the federal provisions and the state program, the federal law 
would control for the purpose of establishing eligibility.70 
Although Dublino did not explicitly overrule King, Townsend, 
and Carleson, it may well have limited their application. Dublino 
departed from the earlier cases by upholding state conditions on 
eligibility that were not explicitly authorized by the Act. Moreover, 
the Court suggested that the earlier decisions dealt with situations 
in which the Social Security Act expressly granted eligibility to the 
plaintiffs, 71 although those opinions rested on the fact that the Act 
had not expressly denied eligibility.72 In his dissent in Dublino, 
Justice Marshall noted that the majority opinion ignored the thrust 
of King, Townsend, and Carleson, and emphasized the need for a 
clear statement of legislative intent before a variation from federal 
65. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(l9), 637, 640 (1970), 607(b), 670(c), 630-36, 638-39, 641-44 
(Supp. II, 1972). 
67. 413 U.S. at 422. 
68. 413 U.S. at 414-17. 
69. 413 U.S. at 422-23. 
70. 413 U.S. at 423 n.29. 
71. 413 U.S. at 421-22. 
72. See text at notes 46-61 supra, 
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requirements of eligibility for AFDC benefits would be permitted.73 
Dublino perhaps should not be read as changing the basic thesis 
of King, Townsend, and Carleson that state deviations from federal 
eligibility standards can be tolerated only if expressly allowed by the 
language and legislative history of the Social Security Act. Neverthe-
less, the cases do seem to present conflicting theories as to the proper 
construction of the Act. Dublino reads the Act as delineating the 
outer limits of federal participation, within which states may further 
restrict eligibility; King, Townsend, and Carleson interpret the Act 
to mandate state aid to individuals eligible under federal standards 
if the state elects to participate in the AFDC program. Federal courts 
dealing with the question of AFDC aid to the unborn have recog-
nized this tension and have reached varied results.74 · 
It may be possible, however, to reconcile the four cases. In the 
first place, King, Townsend, and Carleson revolved around section 
406(a) of the Act,75 which sets out the qualifications an individual 
must have to be eligible for assistance. On the other hand, Dublino 
concerned section 402(a)(l9),76 one of the twenty-three different re-
quirements listed in section 402(a) that a state program must meet 
in order to receive federal funding. Thus, the rule of construction 
developed in King, Townsend, and Carleson may be limited to ques-
tions concerning the type of individual eligible for aid under the 
Act; in other words, those persons arguably eligible under federal 
standards must be assisted unless they fall under a state exclusion 
that Congress has specifically authorized. The Dublino rule may be 
restricted to analyses of the validity of state procedural conditions 
for assistance: Such limitations will be permitted so long as they are 
not clearly disapproved of in the Act. 
The dichotomy developed above seems to be consistent with the 
policies of the Social Security Act. Granting the states wide leeway 
in the administration of their AFDC programs-one aspect of the 
Dublino holding-accords with the idea that the AFDC program is 
a joint federal-state effort that allows for significant state autonomy. 
The Act specifically gives the states a great degree of flexibility in 
determining the amount of benefits to be given an eligible recipi• 
73. 413 U.S. at 432. 
74. See, e.g., Doe v. Luk.hard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd., 493 F.2d 54 
(4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. May 28, 1974) (No. 
73-1763); Alcala v. Bums, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S. 
March 18, 1975) [See Postscript-Ed.]; Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974) 
{utilizing the traditional interpretation of King, Townsend, and Carleson to hold 
that the unborn child is entitled to AFDC benefits); Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750 
(2d Cir. 1974); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (utilizing the 
Dublino standard and concluding that assistance is not required). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (Supp. II, 1972). 
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ent.77 Moreover, wide latitude with respect to state procedural con-
ditions on eligibility is implicit in the Act. For example, states may 
demand verification of an individual's need for assistance,78 although 
the Act itself does not so provide. Similarly, states must create their 
own applications processes;70 the Act is silent on the subject. Finally, 
although the Act gives the states no explicit mandate to require re-
cipients to submit to home visits by caseworkers as a condition for 
aid, the Supreme Court validated such a requirement in Wyman v. 
]ames.80 In that case New York had permitted assistance to be ter-
minated if the recipient refused to consent to a home visit by a case-
worker.81 The Court refused to accept the argument that a home 
visit was a "search" within the fourth amendment, 82 and allowed the 
condition to stand. There was no inquiry whether the federal 
statute permitted a home visit as a condition of eligibility; the Court 
simply cited a few provisions of the Social Security Act to demon-
strate that the visits served a purpose that was consistent with the 
goals of the AFDC program.83 Wyman is consistent with Dublino 
in that it upheld a procedural condition on eligibility that was not 
specifically provided for in the Act. 
Strong policy reasons mitigate in favor of restricting Dublino 
to the procedural area, however, and against extending it to substan-
tive questions of eligibility. First, equitable considerations argue for 
mandatory federal eligibility standards. Compliance ·with state pro-
cedural conditions permissible under Dublino and under section 
402(a) is a matter of choice. Administrative requirements do not 
drastically alter the basic reach of the AFDC program. On the other 
hand, substantive state eligibility prerequisites affect families on the 
basis of characteristics they are relatively powerless to change, such 
as the age of the dependent child and the absence of a parent. Sig-
nificant state latitude in articulating new requirements will therefore 
lead to great variations among the states as to the classes of persons 
eligible to receive benefits. 
Apart from the possible inequity of such a situation, the increas-
ing federal financial and regulatory contributions to the AFDC 
program warrant less state discretion in fixing eligibility require-
77. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968). 
78. See, e.g., Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected 
Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1307, 1308, 
1316-19 (1967); MICH. DEFT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, .As.5ISTANCE PAYMENTS MANUAL, Item 
201, at 12-15 (March 1, 1974) [hereinafter PAYJ\ffiNTS MANUAL]. 
79. See LAW OF THE PooR, supra note 12, at 297; Comment, supra note 78, at 1313, 
See, e.g., PAYJ\ffiNTS MANUAL, supra note 78, Item 201, at 3-21. 
80. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
81. 400 U.S. at 310. 
82. 400 U.S. at 317, 
83. 400 U.S. at 315. 
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ments than the Dublino rule would allow. The relative share and 
absolute level of federal AFDC funding have risen consistently since 
1935.84 Moreover, statutory provisions increasing federal supervision 
have proliferated since the enactment of the program. 85 AFDC has 
evolved from a program with a strong state orientation to one deeply 
tinted with a federal bias. Mandatory federal guidelines for deciding 
the type of individual to receive aid is in keeping with this trend. 
There is also a benefit to be gained from explicit criteria for in-
terpreting the Social Security Act. In his dissent in Dublino, Justice 
Marshall noted that "[t]he policy of clear statement in Townsend 
serves a useful purpose. It informs legislators that, if they wish to 
alter the accommodations previously arrived at in an Act of major 
importance, they must indicate clearly that wish, since what may 
appear to be minor changes of narrow scope may in fact have rami-
fications throughout the administration of the Act."86 The require-
ment under King, Townsend, and Carleson of explicit authority for 
state alteration of eligibility requirements gives Congress notice of 
how its amendments to the Social Security Act ·will be read and 
stimulates it to give careful consideration to whether it desires state 
flexibility in setting eligibility requirements. 
It might also be noted that if a Dublino presumption allowing 
state restrictions on all criteria for eligibility were to govern, a state 
might be able to implement limitations that contravene the purposes 
of the AFDC program as set out in section 40 I of the Social Security 
Act.87 Thus, a state could exclude ten-year-old children from as-
sistance because there is no specific mandate in the Act to aid them. 
This exclusion would be contrary to the intent of Congress to aid 
needy dependent children, and Dublino should not be read to al-
low it. 
Inasmuch as the right of the unborn child to AFDC benefits in-
volves a question of the eligibility of individuals under section 
406(a),88 rather than a procedural limitation conditioning the receipt 
of welfare benefits pursuant to section 402,89 the King-Townsend-
Carleson standard of interpretation of the Social Security Act is ap-
plicable. Unborn children are thus entitled to AFDC benefits if 
84. See, e.g., 1972 U.S. CODE CoNG. SERV. 4990, 4992; 1956 U.S. CoDE CONG. SERv. 
3940; H.R. REP. No. 544, supra note 13, at 110. For the current formula for federal 
contribution, see 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1970); note 5 supra. 
85. Compare Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 402(a), 49 Stat. 627, with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a) (Supp. II, 1972). 
86. 413 U.S. at 431. Adherence to the King rule would mean that any congressional 
expansion of eligibility under the AFDC program would be mandatory on the states, 
unless Congress specifically indicated that it wished the expansion to be optional. 
87. 42 u.s.c. § 601 (1970). 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. II, 1972). 
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they are arguably eligible for aid under federal eligibility standards, 
state exclusions notwithstanding. A discussion of their status under 
federal law occupies the balance of this note. 
Beginning with a literal analysis of the statute, eligibility is con-
ferred on needy dependent children who are deprived of the care 
and support of a parent and who are under the age of eighteen.00 
Some lower courts have relied on the dictionary definition of the 
word "child," which includes fetuses,01 in granting benefits to unborn 
children.02 Another court allowed unborn children to be excluded 
on the basis of the medical definition of the word "child."08 Still 
other courts have found the term "dependent child" ambiguous.04 
Perhaps the most that can be said with any assurance is that the 
term can be construed to include the unborn, and, more importantly, 
it does not clearly exclude them. 
The legislative history of the Social Security Act and its amend-
ments is similarly ambiguous. In 1972, Congress considered but did 
not pass a provision excluding the unborn child from the AFDC 
program.05 Different courts have drawn different conclusions from 
this congressional deliberation;96 its ambiguity is highlighted by in-
dications that "the reason the legislation was not passed was because 
the Congress decided to deal only with the Adult Categories of Pub-
lic Assistance .... "07 Again, the most that can be said is that in 1972 
Congress was aware that federal funds were being used by some 
states to aid unborn children under the AFDC program. 
Some courts have discerned a congressional purpose to aid the 
unborn from the provision for maternity and health care in the Child 
Health Act.98 This legislation does evidence a concern for the ade-
90. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). 
91. Among the definitions of the word "child" in Webster's Third New Interna• 
tional Dictionary is "an unborn • • • human being." 
92. Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. ll90, ll92 (D. Conn.), revd., 507 F.2d 750 
(2d Cir. 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 802 (D. Mass. 1973); Harris v. 
Mississippi State Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 363 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (N.D. Miss. 1973), 
affd. sub nom. Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 
F. Supp. ll47, ll54 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd., 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974). 
93. Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 54 (M.D. Fla. 1974). 
94. Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1974); Carver v. Hooker, 369 
F. Supp. 204, 212 (D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974), petition for cert. 
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 74-242). 
95. See H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1972); S. REP. No. 92-1230, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1972). 
96. Compare Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, ll54-55 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd., 
499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), and Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 803 (D. Mass. 
1973), with Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 
(1974). 
97. Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974). 
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-05 (1970). E.g., Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 212-15 
(D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 
798, 802-03 (D. Mass. 1973). 
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quacy of prenatal care, but the argument fails because of the legis-
lative chronology: Unborn children have been granted AFDC bene-
fits since 1946,99 while the program for maternity and infant care 
was not enacted until 1963.100 The only safe conclusion is that the 
Child Health Act provides no evidence that there was ever an intent 
to exclude the unborn child from the AFDC program. 
In light of the ambiguity of the statute and its legislative his-
tory, reference must be made to other factors. One such factor is the 
administrative interpretation of the HEW.101 HEW regulations per-
mit states to aid unborn children,102 thereby impliedly including that 
group within the basic eligible group of "dependent children." Aid 
is not mandatory, however; matching federal funds are available to 
states participating in the AFDC program whether or not their plans 
include unborn children.103 
The proper deference to be accorded the HEW regulation is 
integral to the analysis of the unborn child's eligibility. If the regula-
tion is deemed conclusive, then federal law itself allows states to ex-
clude unborn children, and the King-Townsend-Carleson line of 
cases is inapplicable. If the regulation is totally disregarded, the 
eligibility of the unborn child for assistance remains ambiguous un-
der federal law. Finally, one might defer to the regulation in so far 
as it includes the unborn child within the term "dependent child," 
but disregard it to the extent that it allows the states to refuse to aid 
unborn children.104 
99. See DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC Assis-
TANCE ADMINISTRATION § 3412.6 (Nov. 4, 1946). The HEW administrative practice re-
garding the unborn developed out of an audit policy in 1941 regarding Wisconsin's 
AFDC program, which provided aid to the unborn child, and later evolved into a 
regulation. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1974). See note 22 supra. 
100. Act of Oct. 24, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-156, 77 Stat. 273. Courts have argued 
that the language and purpose of the Child Health Act indicate an intent to provide 
maternity aid in those provisions rather than under the AFDC program. See Wisdom 
v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 755 n.27 (2d Cir. 1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 54 
(M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974). However, there is no indication in statu-
tory language or legislative history that the Child Health Act provision for prenatal 
care was to be the only means by which such care was to be encouraged. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 703 (1970); S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-99 (1967); (H.R. REP. No. 544, 
supra note 13, at 124-30. 
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) provides: "The Secretary ••• shall make and publish 
such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Act as may be necessary to the 
efficient administration with which the Secretary is charged." 
102. See note 22 supra. 
103. The HEW contends that aid to the unborn child is optional because the 
definition of "dependent child" in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970) is not binding on the states. 
See Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
104. See Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 1974), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4374 
(U.S. March 18, 1975) [See Postscript-Ed.]; Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823, 
829 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd., 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 
U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. May 24, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 
1147, 1153 (N.D. III. 1973), affd., 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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The Court has not followed a consistent approach toward in-
terpreting HEW regulations in the welfare context. As a general 
rule, deference is traditionally given to the regulations of an ad-
ministrative agency granted rulemaking authority to interpret an 
organic statute.105 The Supreme Court explicitly applied this rule 
of statutory construction in Lewis v. Martin,106 holding that Cali-
fornia could not consider a dependent child's resources to include any 
income of a man assuming the role of a spouse, absent a showing of 
actual financial contribution, because there would othenvise be a 
conflict with an HEW regulation.107 
Where an HEW regulation has conflicted with statutory eligibil-
ity requirements, however, it has been ignored. Thus, in Townsend 
v. Swank108 the Court disregarded an HEW regulation that impliedly 
permitted states to alter their eligibility requirements from federal 
standards.109 The Court stated: "[T]he principle that accords sub-
stantial weight to interpretation of a statute by the department en-
trusted with its administration is inapplicable insofar as those 
regulations are inconsistent with the requirements of § 402(a)(I0) 
that aid be furnished 'to all eligible individuals.' "110 In Carleson v. 
Remillard111 the Court dealt with an HEW regulation that ap-
proved state plans permitting the payment of federal AFDC funds 
to families in which the absence of a parent was due to military 
service. The regulation also approved state plans under which such 
families were not given assistance.112 The Court was influenced by 
the regulation to the extent that the HEW defined "continued 
absence" to include military absence. Based upon its decisions in 
King and Townsend, however, the Court rejected the validity of the 
regulation to the extent that it allowed states to withdraw the bene-
fits at issue: "We search the Act in vain ... for any authority to 
make 'continued absence' into an accordion-like concept, applicable 
to some parents because of 'continued absence' but not to others."118 
The Court's approach in Carleson is appropriate for the analy-
sis of the unborn child's eligibility for public assistance benefits. In-
asmuch as the HEW asserts that an unborn child is eligible under 
the Act as a "dependent child," its direction that states may disre-
105. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United 
States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939). 
106. 397 U.S. 552 (1970). 
107. 397 U.S. at 559-60. 
108. 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971). 
109. 45 C.F.R. § 233.lO(a)(l)(ii) (1973). For a general discussion, see Note, Welfare's 
"Condition X", 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967). 
110. 404 U.S. at 286 (emphasis original). 
lll. 406 U.S. 598 (1972). 
112. 406 U.S. at 602. 
113. 406 U.S. at 602. 
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gard the federal eligibility standard is invalid under King, Towns-
end, and Carleson.114 On the other hand, it would· be inconsistent 
for the HEW to assert that the unborn are not eligible as "dependent 
children" and yet allow federal funds to be disbursed to state pro-
grams aiding the unborn, because section 403 allows funds to be 
extended only to eligible individuals.115 It is thus logical to infer 
that the unborn child is a "dependent child" within section 406(a) 
of the Act116 on the basis of the HEW regulation. States must there-
fore provide aid to the unborn under King, Townsend, and Carleson. 
Another factor that might bear on the analysis of whether the 
unborn child falls within the term "dependent child" is the status 
of the unborn in other areas of the law. In Roe v. Wade117 the Su-
preme Court considered the status of an unborn child in the context 
of examining the constitutionality of legislation forbidding most 
abortions. Grounding its analysis on the individual's constitutional 
right to privacy,118 the Court upheld the right of a pregnant woman 
to obtain an abortion. Although it rejected the state's asserted in-
terest in the protection of the fetus because the word "person" as 
used in the fourteenth amendment119 did not encompass the unborn 
child,12° the Court found the state's interest in the protection of the 
fetus "compelling" at the point of viability.121 Neither the exclusion 
of the unborn child from the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment nor the Coun's conclusion that the state's interest in regulating 
abortions does not begin until viability precludes Congress from en-
acting legislation designed to aid the unborn child. Indeed, it might 
be argued that permitting a pregnant mother to receive AFDC as-
sistance furthers the constitutional right to privacy developed in 
Wade. The Court in Wade concluded that that right was "broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy."122 The state abortion statute at issue was invalid be-
114. See text at notes 46-64 supra. 
115. 42 u.s.c. § 603 (1970). 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). 
117. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For critical analyses of Roe, see Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Comment, Roe v. Wade 
and the Traditional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 715 (1974). 
118. 410 U.S. at 155. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (companion case). 
119, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, provides in part: "No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall ••• deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
120, 410 U.S. at 157-58, 
121. 410 U.S. at 164-65. Once the fetus is viable, "the State in promoting its interest 
in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe abor-
tion •••• " 410 U.S. at 164-65. "Viability" was not specifically defined, but the Court 
noted that it included fetuses "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, 
albeit with artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 160. 
122. 410 U.S. at 157. 
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cause it denied the pregnant woman the right to make that choice. 
If the needy pregnant mother cannot obtain assistance prior to giv-
ing birth, her choice whether to have the child is likewise impeded. 
It is not inconceivable that the inability of an impoverished woman 
to meet the costs of adequate prenatal medical care and nutrition 
would drive her to seek an abortion. The provision of AFDC 
aid to unborn children thus has the potential for promoting the 
freedom of personal choice that assumed importance in Wade. 
Although the law has recognized the interests of unborn children 
in other areas,123 it has taken no consistent approach. A number of 
jurisdictions have recognized a right of recovery for the wrongful 
death of a stillborn child because of prenatal injuries.124 The un-
born child has been recognized as a person for the purpose of ac-
quiring property rights, and is permitted to be represented by 
guardians ad litem.125 The diversity of the law with respect to the 
unborn, however, suggests that each question concerning the legal 
status of the unborn child must be answered separately. It therefore 
is necessary to inquire whether substantial policy reasons mandate 
that the unborn child be included within the term "dependent 
child" in section 40 I of the Social Security Act. 
Section 40 I states that the goal of the AFDC program is to en-
courage the care of needy dependent children by maintaining and 
strengthening the family unit.126 The extent to which the unborn 
child needs aid was conceded even in Parks v. Harden,121 a case that 
held in the district court against mandatory aid to the unborn child: 
"There can be no question that, in terms of need and dependency, 
many unborn children are in far more severe circumstances than 
born children, who, at least, have the possibility of an active mother 
capable of assisting in their care and support."12s 
123. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsis• 
tencies, 46 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 349 (1971); Comment, Negligence and the Unborn Child: 
A Time for Change, IS S.D. L. REv. 204 (1973). 
124. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 338 (4th ed. 1971); Note, supra 
note 123, at 354-60; Comment, supra note 123, at 215-19. The majority rule denies 
recovery, however. w. PROSSER, supra, at 335-38; 2 F. HARPER 8: F. JAMES, THE LAW 
OF TORTS 1028-31 (1956). 
125. Note, supra note 123, at 351-54; Comment, supra note 123, at 214. 
126. Section 401, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970), provides: 
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own 
homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial 
assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the 
conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives 
with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to 
help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum 
self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of con-
tinuing parental care and protection, there is authorized to be appropriated for 
each fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this part. 
See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313 (1968). 
127. 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973), revd., 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974). 
128. 354 F. Supp. at 622. 
January 1975] Notes 579 
Moreover, granting AFDC benefits to pregnant mothers, and 
thereby promoting prenatal care and nutrition, would contribute to 
the maintenance of the family unit. Overwhelming evidence shows 
that there is a severe problem of prenatal malnutrition in the United 
States, especially among poor families.129 A woman's nutritional needs 
rise dramatically during pregnancy, but the dietary supplements 
available to the middle-class mother are virtually unknmvn to the 
poor.1so 
Malnutrition during pregnancy may have severe consequences 
at all stages of a child's health and development. Before birth, in-
adequate nutrition increases the likelihood of complications of preg-
nancy such as anemia, toxemia, threatened and actual miscarriages, 
premature births, and stillbirths.131 Children of mothers who had 
deficient prepartum diets have a higher susceptibility to illness dur-
ing infancy182 and are more likely to die within a year of birth than 
children of mothers who had proper nourishment during preg-
nancy.1ss 
The effects of prenatal malnutrition also extend to the child's la-
ter life, influencing his subsequent physical and psychological devel-
opment.184 There is increasing medical evidence that a lack of protein 
prior to birth can cause severe brain damage136 that usually cannot 
be reversed by subsequent nutrition and medical care.136 In addition, 
a strong correlation exists between mental retardation and prenatal 
malnutrition.137 
Inasmuch as adequate prenatal diets and medical care frequently 
are financially unavailable to poor mothers,138 the receipt of AFDC 
benefits may be crucial to the well-being of the child both before 
and after birth. The health of a child is in turn important to the 
family's cohesiveness, which suggests that the eligibility for AFDC 
129. CITIZENS' BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, HUNGER, U.S.A. 20 (1968) [hereinafter HUNGER, U.S.A.]. 
130. Id. 
131. P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KAGAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALU'Y 81 
(1969). 
132. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 29; Weihofen, Poverty and Mental Health, 
54 CALIF. L. REv. 920, 923 (1966). 
133. Katz, Ignorance Aggravates U.S. Nutrition Policies, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 23, 
1974, § C, at 16, col. 1. 
134. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 30; J. MAYER, U.S. NUTRITION POLICIES IN 
THE SEvENTIES 17 (1973); Nutrition Hearings, supra note 18, pt. 3, at 1085. 
135. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 30; Katz, supra note 133; Nutrition Hear-
ings, supra note 18, pt. 3, at 1085. 
136. J. MAYER, supra note 134, at 20. 
137. P. MUSSEN, J. CoNGER & J. KAGAN, supra note 131, at 81; HUNGER, U.S.A., supra 
note 129, at 30. See generally R. HURLEY, supra note 14; Weihofen, supra note 132, 
at 921-24. 
UIS. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 29-30. 
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benefits of the unborn child comes within the congressional policy as 
announced in section 401 of the Social Security Act.180 
Postscript: 
After this article was sent to press, the Supreme Court decided 
the case of Bums v. Alcala, 43 U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S. March 18, 1975). 
The Court held by a seven-to-one margin that states need not grant 
AFDC benefits to unborn children, in effect following the HEW 
regulation quoted in note 22 supra. 
The first step in the Courts opinion, which was ·written by 
Justice Powell, was to set forth the Court's approach to the statutory 
construction of the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act. 
Justice Powell acknowledged that several lower courts that have ex-
amined the issue have interpreted King, Carleson, and Townsend to 
establish the rule that "persons who are arguably included in the 
federal eligibility standard must be deemed eligible unless the Act 
or its legislative history clearly exhibits an intent to exclude them 
from coverage, in effect creating a presumption of coverage when the 
statute is ambiguous." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4376. The Court rejected this 
rule, noting that it constituted a "departure from ordinary principles 
of statutory interpretation." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4376. Rather, it de-
clared that the three cases "establish only that once the federal 
standard of eligibility is defined, a participating State may not deny 
aid to persons who come within it in the absence of a clear indica-
tion that Congress meant the coverage to be optional." 43 U.S.L.W. 
at 4376. After articulating this approach, the Court devoted the bulk 
of its opinion to a futile examination of the Social Security Act and 
its legislative history for evidence that Congress intended to include 
unborn children in the class eligible for AFDC benefits. 
Apparently, then, the first step courts must take in determining 
the validity of substantive state limitations on AFDC eligibility is to 
search for affirmative evidence that Congress intended to benefit the 
plaintiff. Only when satisfied that the plaintiff is included under the 
Act will the Court reach the ultimate issue of the validity of the 
state limitation. 
The Court based its approach on the King trilogy. However, only 
two of the three cases fit comfortably within the Court's analysis. In 
King, the "substitute father" case, there was evidence that Congress 
intended to aid all children who did not have a parent with a legal 
duty to support them. Since the evidence on inclusion was clear, the 
Court struck dmvn the "substitute father" regulation with little 
hesitation. Similarly, in Townsend there was legislative history that 
indicated that students aged 18 to 21 were intended to be covered 
by the Act, although that case ostensibly rested on the finding that 
139. See note 126 supra. 
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the exclusion was not clearly authorized. In Carleson, however, there 
was absolutely no evidence in the Act or its legislative history that 
Congress intended to benefit children with parents who were absent 
due to military service. See text following note 64 supra. The Court 
bypassed the initial question of inclusion, contrary to its approach 
in Alcala, and went directly to the issue of whether Congress had 
explicitly authorized states to exclude such children from eligibility. 
Finding no such authorization, the Court struck down the state 
limitation. 
In most cases the difference between the "presumption of cov-
erage" approach the Court arguably took in Carleson and the neutral 
approach the Court took in Alcala will be of little significance. Usu-
ally the weight of the evidence will be either for or against inclusion. 
Only in cases in which there is no evidence of legislative intent (or, 
as in Alcala, in which the evidence gives rise to conflicting inferences) 
would the "presumption" approach yield different results. But it is 
in precisely such cases that there must be a presumption of some kind. 
By refusing to presume for the plaintiff, the Court in Alcala in effect 
presumed for the defendant. This choice may have been unfortunate. 
AFDC is a remedial program designed to aid needy children and 
their families. When issues of eligibility have arisen under other fed-
eral remedial legislation, such as Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
301-06 (1970), federal courts customarily have construed eligibility 
criteria liberally and extended benefits to individuals who were not 
clearly covered. See, e.g., H_aberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 
1969); Rasmussen v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967); Dieno 
v. Celebrezze, 347 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1965); Leitz v. Flemming, 264 
F.2d 311 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 820 (1959); Schwing v. 
United States, 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948). A similar pattern has 
prevailed in state court construction of workmen's compensation 
laws. See, e.g., Green v. Burch, 164 Kan. 348, 189 P.2d 892 (1948); 
Boen v. Foster, 241 Miss. 520, 130 S.2d 877 (1961); Jones v. Loving, 
363 P.2d 512 (Okla. 1961); Shubert v. Steelman, 214 Tenn. 102, 377 
S.W.2d 940 (1964). Moreover, to hold that a group need not be given 
aid because it does not fall within federal eligibility standards and 
at the same time allow federal funds to be used by states that do 
decide to aid that group-as the Court held in Alcala-may do 
violence to the federal nature of the AFDC program. See text at note,s 
84-85 supra. 
The Court's holding with respect to the validity of a state'f. 
refusal to grant aid to persons who are eligible under federal stan-
dards is more encouraging. The Court stated: "The State must pro-
vide benefits to all individuals who meet the federal definition of 
'dependent child' and who are 'needy' under state standards, unless 
they are excluded or aid is made optional by another provision of 
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the Act." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4375. Surprisingly, the Court cited Dub lino 
as well as the King trilogy in support of this statement. In Dublino, 
it will be recalled, the Court upheld a state-imposed condition of 
eligibility that was not expressly authorized under the Social Se-
curity Act. See text at notes 65-73 supra. By requiring "a clear indi-
cation that Congress meant the coverage to be optional," 43 U.S.L.W. 
at 4376, the Court in Alcala infused new life into King, Carleson, 
and Townsend and gave reason to hope that Dub lino would perhaps 
be limited to state-imposed procedural requirements. See text at notes 
71-87 supra. On the other hand, since the Court did not find that 
unborn children fell within the federal standard, the validity of a 
state refusal to grant aid to eligible individuals was not squarely 
placed in issue, and the future application of Dublino remains un-
certain. 
The bulk of the Court's opinion was devoted to analyzing whether 
unborn children fell within the Act's definition of "dependent 
child." The Court correctly concluded that there was no explicit 
legislative history or statutory language that indicated that the un-
born were included. However, the Court rejected the claim that 
the HEW regulation authorizing states to grant AFDC benefits to 
unborn, needy children was evidence that such children came under 
the Act. Instead, the Court accepted the HEW's argument that "un-
born children are not included in the federal eligibility standard 
and ... the regulation authorizing federal participation in AFDC 
payments to pregnant women is based on the agency's general au-
thority to make rules for efficient administration of the Act. 42 
U.S.C. § 1302." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4377. The Court noted that the regu-
lation appeared alongside "other rules authorizing temporary aid, 
at the option of the States, to individuals in the process of gaining 
or losing eligibility for the AFDC program." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4377. 
The other rules authorizing temporary aid, however, were pro-
mulgated pursuant to and were in accord with section 406(e) of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970), which defines 
"emergency assistance to needy families with children." Emergency 
assistance is clearly stated to be within each state's option, but it 
cannot be granted for more than 30 days. Assistance to pregnant 
women on behalf of their unborn children may exceed 30 days under 
the HEW regulation, as it is conditioned only on the determination 
of pregnancy by medical diagnosis. The "unborn children" regu-
lation thus stands alone in this area as an instance of the HEW's 
rule-making power under 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). Seen in this light, 
"the agency's assertion that it has never deemed unborn children to 
be within the eligibility provisions of § 406(a)" must be viewed 
"somewhat skeptically." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4379 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). The more persuasive view is that the regulation, and the long 
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administrative practice conducted pursuant to it, indicate that un-
born children do come under the Acts definition of "dependent
child."
Notes
